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In the second half of the twentieth century the Japanese thinker 
most responsible for building bridges between Zen Buddhism and 
Western thought has, without question, been Masao Abe. It was my 
good fortune to have attended a two-year discussion group at Haver­
ford College in Haverford, Pennsylvania led by Professor Abe on the 
Kyoto School of philosophy and its implications for comparative and 
cross-cultural thought, East and West. I came away from that ex­
perience with a deep sense of indebtedness to Abe sensei, not only for 
the intellectual feast he laid before us, but also for his openness to each 
of us participants, no matter what our sophistication or lack thereof on 
the subjects under discussion. His personal magnanimity and gentle 
humor were matched only by the seriousness and thoughtfulness with 
which he responded to each of our questions, doubts or criticisms. As a 
teacher he was the embodiment of intellectual integrity, personal 
warmth, and spiritual life-wisdom.
It is a privilege, therefore, to enter into this discussion with Pro­
fessor Abe. In exercise of this responsibility I shall try in what follows 
to raise the best critical questions I can of Masao Abe’s most recent 
book, Zen and Western Thought, a book reflective of the discussions 
we had at Haverford College. The reader should understand that I do 
this not because I think any the less of Professor Abe’s philosophical 
achievement, but on the contrary, because I respect it so highly and 
have been stimulated by it so greatly. In our colloquium Professor Abe 
continually invited us to do our best in critically examining and respon­
ding to the issues under discussion. It follows that when it comes to a 
discussion of his own work, he would not have us do any less. It is only 
by taking such philosophical work as that of Masao Abe with the ut­
most seriousness and entering into the most strenuous critical dialogue 
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with it that this late-twentieth century project of constructive global 
philosophy, for which Masao Abe above all has shown the way, can go 
forward. This too I learned from Abe sensei.
Masao Abe’s book, Zen and Western Thought, represents the 
mature fruits of his decades-long effort at cross-cultural bridge­
building. In this book he enters into a profound dialogue with Western 
philosophy and theology from the standpoint of a Zen philosophy. In 
attempting to respond to Professor Abe’s Zen thought from a Western 
standpoint, I shall raise a number of question about his approach to 
and carrying out of this dialogue, drawing in part on Heidegger’s 
thought to do so. In the present essay I shall consider several second- 
order or meta-issues in Abe’s understanding of and approach to this 
dialogue. In a subsequent essay, I shall consider some of the first-order 
details of the way he carries out his dialogue and conclude with some 
suggestions of my own.
Part One: Second Order Issues
The fundamental second-order question about Abe’s project is: 
What is Abe’s understanding of the nature of philosophical and inter­
religious dialogue in general, and East-West, Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue in particular?
To begin with, Abe makes it very clear that productive dialogue can 
only proceed on the basis of a prior understanding of the irreducible 
differences between various philosophical and religious ways of think­
ing. Such differences, says Abe, are “not of degree or extent but rather 
of quality and structure’’ (152). They are “systematic” (xxi), “struc­
tural” (xxii, 152, 170), and “deeply rooted” (152). [All references are 
to the 1985 cloth edition of Abe’s book published by the University of 
Hawaii Press. A paperback edition has jnst appeared.]
This general assertion of irreducible differences between Zen and 
Western thought leads to the specific second-order questions I would 
like to address to Abe’s project:
(1) If these ways of thinking are irreducibly different, comparison be­
tween them might be possible by way of pointing out their differences, 
for example, but on what presumably common basis would a positive, 
constructive dialogue proceed?
(2) Is dialogue limited to pointing out and describing these dif­
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ferences—as different answers, say, grounded in alternative sets of 
presuppositions and categories, to common human problems? Or does 
dialogue also consist in the evaluative or normative task of assessing 
which way of thinking is in one or more respects superior or inferior? 
If the latter, by what criteria and from whose standpoint are such com­
parative or dialogical claims to be made?
(3) Why, in particular, does Abe privilege the philosophy of Zen Bud­
dhism and how, without falling into inconsistency, does he never­
theless argue that, despite their irreducible differences, it is the dialogue 
between Buddhism and Christianity above all that is especially well- 
suited for providing a spiritual framework for our emerging global 
civilization?
(4) Is Abe’s model of dialogue, which draws on the terminology and 
structure of Western philosophy, appropriate to the Zen position he 
represents? Is the Western model of philosophical discussion as an en­
counter between irreducibly different systems of thought appropriate 
as a model for understanding inter-religious encounter? While such 
a model might be appropriate for an intra-Western philosophical 
dialogue, is it not surrendering too much to Western modes of thought 
for an Asian thinker to adopt such a model?
I
Abe is not unaware of these questions and responds quite explicitly 
to most of them. For example, with regard to our first question: “On 
what basis can dialogue between systematically different structures of 
thought proceed?” Abe suggests two possible answers. First, despite 
the radical differences between the Zen concept of Nothingness and the 
Christian concept of God as Being, Abe cautions against a simplistic 
reduction of either tradition to these categories, since that would in­
deed eliminate the possibility of any correspondence between them 
(192). He seems to be suggesting the possibility of a more complex, 
perhaps dialectical relationship that would allow for dialogue between 
the two traditions.
Second, Abe also speaks of ‘Being’, ‘Nothingness’ and a third 
category, the ‘Ought’ (represented by Kant’s philosophy) as “the three 
possible answers to the essential possibilities of human existence” (87). 
He thus seems to be suggesting that, despite their irreducible dif­
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ferences as basic categories of thought, Being, Nothingness and the 
Ought may nonetheless be conceived as different answers to the same 
question. Insofar as they share a common concern for human salva­
tion, they may be seen as different solutions to the same fundamental 
problems of human existence (31).
Abe’s answer to our first question, therefore, appears to be that 
despite differences in fundamental metaphysical beliefs, different sys­
tems of religious thought can enter into positive dialogue because of 
(1) shared concern for the presumably common predicament of human 
existence and (2) the possibility of complex logical or dialectical rela­
tionships between these fundamental metaphysical concepts them­
selves.
That a problem appears to remain, however, may be seen in Abe’s 
equally firm insistence not only that Asian and Western categories of 
‘Being’, ‘Nothingness’, and ‘Ought’ are, as “transcendental and ab­
solute”, irreducible to one another, but that, in the central and decisive 
case of Buddhism’s idea of “absolute Nothingness”, there is no 
Western counterpart at all (124). No matter how complex the dialectic 
among them, and despite the fact that each constitutes an answer to the 
same existential problematic, it would seem that, in the final analysis, 
while there is room for comparison, a common basis for dialogue is 
lacking.
II
To decide whether Abe has adequately answered this problem, 
therefore, we need to look at his answer to our second question: “Is 
dialogue a matter simply of describing and comparing differences, or 
does it also involve evaluating which way of thinking is superior? If the 
latter, from whose standpoint and by what criteria are such normative 
claims to be made?
Abe clearly views Buddhist categories of analysis and Zen’s answer 
to the problem of human existence not simply as different but as valid 
alternatives to Western philosophical and religious ones. In itself this 
claim is not necessarily problematic. But does he agree with his editor, 
William LaFleur, when the latter observes that Abe not only sheds 
light on “neglected assumptions and presuppositions” of the Western 
tradition, but also discloses “a certain blind spot in Western ontology 
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that stretches from Plato to Whitehead”, such that, from a Buddhist 
perspective at least, it can only be concluded that “much of Western 
thought. .. consistent with its own original assumption, appears .. . 
philosophically askew** (xvi)?
Abe seems to be of two minds on this issue. On the one hand, he 
seems not to agree with this normative claim. For example, he ex­
presses serious reservations about the adequacy of Zen’s answers and 
the urgent need for Buddhists to listen to and learn from the West. In 
one essay based on a lecture in which Christians were present as in­
terlocutors, Abe more than once insists that his stress on the differences 
of Buddhism and Christianity is not meant as a “rejection or exclusion 
of Christianity from a Zen point of view, or as a presumption of the 
superiority of Zen to Christianity’’ (186). Again: “My emphasis on 
difference does not intend to judge which one is better’’ (202). To point 
out differences, to present alternative answers, even to raise critical 
questions and pose intellectual challenges to traditions other than one’s 
own, is not necessarily to imply a negative evaluation of that other 
tradition nor the superiority of one’s own. It is to issue an invitation, 
as best one can, from one’s own perspective, to further dialogue, as 
Abe puts it, “beyond the essential differences’’ (ibid.). Critical ques­
tioning of the other’s tradition “will not destroy but rather deepen” 
that tradition (ibid.). Further, Abe is quite willing to admit that his 
criticisms of Christianity from a Zen point of view may themselves be 
based on an understanding of Christianity (or Western thought general­
ly) that is “insufficient and limited.” Thus he invites correction in 
return, his own analyses being “completely open to your criticism” 
(186).
Elsewhere, however, Abe seems to speak as as apologist on behalf of 
Zen’s answers to the human condition. He reminds us, quite properly, 
that parties engaged in dialogue can only approach and enter into that 
dialogue from the standpoint of their respective traditions. He explicit­
ly acknowledges that one of his commitments is “to promoting a 
dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism from the side of Bud­
dhism" (172, italics mine). As we have seen, it is not easy to pursne 
such dialogue—in Abe’s term, to “bridge” the two—“unless the struc­
tural differences in their systems are somehow overcome” (168). Here 
Abe draws our attention to a new and added requirement for the 
possibility of dialogue. It is not enough to cite shared existential con­
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cerns or a possible dialectic between fundamental concepts. These 
efforts themselves must proceed from some particular first-order stand­
point, some specific presuppositions, of one tradition or the other. In 
short, there are only two ways of “overcoming” or “bridging” the 
systematic, structural differences between two systems of thought, and 
that, however paradoxical it may sound, is by proceeding from one 
side or the other. It cannot be done from some third, allegedly univer­
sal or neutral standpoint external or common to both.
This new requirement in turn raises a new problem, however. Ap­
proaching the task of bridge-building from one side or the other would 
seem to entail that the resulting judgments will not be merely descrip­
tive but will convey normative implications as well. For reference to a 
“point of view” is also a way of referring to certain criteria or stan­
dards of comparison and judgment. As Abe goes on to say: “I have 
tried to clarify the differences of the thought structures of the two 
systems by using the conceptions of Mahayana Buddhism as the stan­
dard and by trying to see how closely Whitehead's philosophy ap­
proaches Mahayana Buddhism" (169; italics mine). What matters 
here, however, is that while Abe freely admits to doing his work of 
bridge-building “from the side of Buddhism”, he is also quite willing, 
and in fact expects, that Christians (or Western thinkers) would ap­
proach such a conversation and issue critical judgments similarly from 
their point of view, using their criteria and standards. Thus, Abe con­
tinues, “I do not, of course, exclude the opposite approach of using [a 
given Western] philosophy as the standard and then taking a look as to 
how close Mahayana Buddhism comes to it” (ibid.). Indeed, he notes 
that Tillich, in his book on Christianity’s encounter with other world 
religions, which includes a chapter on Christian-Buddhist conversa­
tion, similarly employs “Christian criteria for judging Christianity and 
religion in general” (185).
Having noted this, however, it should be pointed out that Abe’s pro­
ject of using the conceptions of one side as the standard or criteria for 
describing and assessing the other side involves, of necessity, judging 
how each side does in answering a common set of questions not by a 
set of criteria, possibly universal in nature but in any case common to 
each, but by criteria specific only to one of the parties to the dialogue. 
For Abe that means, specifically, judging the adequacy of the other 
tradition’s answers by how nearly they approximate one’s own (“by try­
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ing to see how closely Whitehead’s philosophy approaches Mahayana 
Buddhism”). To the extent that the other tradition does not approx­
imate the Zen answer, to that extent it perhaps needs to engage in a fun­
damental re-examination of its basic assumptions and presuppositions. 
(As we shall see, Abe nowhere suggests that to the extent Western 
answers do not approach the Zen answer, to that extent the Zen tradi­
tion’s fundamental categories and criteria need to be re-examined. He 
does say that Zen needs to learn from the West’s answers, but that is a 
different matter, and as we shall see, one quite consistent with maintain­
ing that the fundamental categories of the Zen tradition need not be 
brought into question as a result of such dialogue).
The problem this poses for Abe’s effort (what I referred to earlier as 
his appearing to be of “two minds” about the matter) is that there 
seems to be a logical inconsistency between maintaining, on the one 
hand, that one is not engaged in judging which system is better or 
superior, while on the other hand noting that all of one’s judgments 
are being made from the standpoint of one’s own tradition, in par­
ticular with reference to the question how closely that other tradition’s 
answers approximate one’s own (presumably normative) answers. Is 
this a serious inconsistency in his project, or is it simply an expression 
of the fact that these are, despite the systematic intent of the collection, 
occasional pieces written over an eighteen year span of time? Can we 
find an underlying rationale for what on the surface seems an effort 
that proceeds in two different directions at once? Or does this point to 
an unavoidable but instructive and not necessarily fatal “circularity” 
in any such second-order project of philosophical or inter-religious 
dialogue? Clearly this is an issue we must examine in more detail.
Abe does in fact make normative claims about the superiority of 
Zen philosophy to Western thought on the basis of the irreducible 
difference between the Buddhist category of absolute Nothingness and 
Western notions of Being and God. What, and of what sort, are some 
of these claims that Abe makes “from the Buddhist side”?
In Abe’s view surely the fundamental difference, and the basis for 
such normative claims as he makes, has to do with the respective Zen 
and Western perspectives on the phenomenon of “Nothingness” and 
its significance for their respective understandings of the nature of “Be­
ing”. We have already noted that, on the one hand, Abe thinks it is an 
“oversimplification” to say that “Zen is based on Nothingness, while 
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Christianity is based on God as Being” (192), and yet he also argues 
that the understanding of Nothingness as the ultimate metaphysical 
principle has no counterpart in the West. Abe supports this latter claim 
with the observation that there is an essentially different experience, 
and hence understanding, of the negativity of beings, including human 
existence, in the East than in the West (109): “The negativity of human­
life is felt more seriously and deeply in Buddhism than among the 
followers of Western intellectual traditions” (130). The corresponding 
concept of nothingness (Japanese: mu) is therefore not taken as a basic 
(that is, positive) metaphysical principle in the West but is rather 
always viewed as “a secondary, negative” principle (99).
In the East, by contrast, the negativity of beings, and human being, 
and the corresponding ontological principle of ‘Nothingness’ are “not 
considered inferior but equal to positivity” (130). From this perspec­
tive, Zen is forced to ask Western thought to provide an ontological 
justification for the alleged priority of Being over Nothingness, and 
this, in Abe’s view, the West has singularly failed to do, thus exposing, 
as LaFleur had said, “a certain blindspot in Western ontology that 
stretches from Plato to Whitehead” (xvi). Not only has the West not 
done so, from the Zen point of view it is unable, indeed impossible for 
it to provide such a justification: “The priority of (u) being over {mu) 
non-being is not ontologically justifiable with regard to things in 
general and humans in particular. This is the position held by Bud­
dhism” (109). It is not only not justified, it is not justifiable. Abe is 
not just making a descriptive observation, he is making a normative 
claim. Measured by Buddhist standards, the Western ascription of on­
tological priority to Being over Nothingness is philosophically un­
justifiable.
On the basis of his claim that the Buddhist ontological principle of 
‘Nothingness’ is philosophically preferable to the Western principle of 
the ontological priority of ‘Being’, Abe proceeds to draw three further 
normative conclusions concerning specific Western philosophical and 
theological discussions of Being and God:
(1) First, as regards Western metaphysical discussions, this critique 
applies not only to Plato and Whitehead, as we have already seen, but 
to Aristotle, Spinoza, and even such “deconstructionists” of the 
Western tradition of thinking about ‘Being* as Nietzsche and Heideg­
ger. The basic problem in all of these thinkers is that when the ultimate 
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is understood as ‘Being* rather than ‘Nothingness*, the ultimate is 
“still somewhat objectified’’, “not completely free from duality’’ 
(primarily, the duality of ‘subject-object’), and thus is in fact “found­
ed on an unconsciously posited, hidden, last presupposition. Is not 
priority finally given to the positive pole of every duality?” (180). For 
example, when he is contrasted to DOgen, we see that even Spinoza is 
not free of the duality between ‘God* and ‘World’, in which “the 
former has priority” (38-39). Again, though historically Nagarjuna 
was unaware of Aristotle’s doctrine of Being, nevertheless essentially 
Nagarjuna’s doctrine of Emptiness (Nothingness) “transcended Aristo­
telian ‘Being*.... Mahayana Buddhism’s standpoint... is established 
by radically overthrowing ‘Being’ in the Aristotelian sense” (108). In 
fact (drawing not only on Buddhism but on Nietzsche?), Abe contends 
that “Aristotelian Being would seem to have been a fabrication pro­
jected by a human mind unable to endure actuality, in which being 
and non-being are mutually negating” (110). Even Nietzsche is not 
spared, however, insofar as his appeal to the will-to-power as a positive 
metaphysical doctrine rests on the familiar Western tendency to “objec­
tify” even our value-constructs. The “will-to-power” is posited on an 
ontological ground (139-140). Whitehead’s process doctrine of God, 
on the other hand, is also criticized as “not quite compatible with the 
Buddhist idea of dependent co-origination” (a term synonymous in 
Abe’s usage with Emptiness or Nothingness). By making God a non­
temporal principle of limitation for the interpretation of everything in 
the temporal world, Whitehead makes God “somewhat beyond”, so 
that Whitehead, unlike Buddhism, is unable to say “there is absolutely 
nothing behind” the interdependence of things in the temporal 
universe (158-159).
This brings us to what is, for me, the most interesting dialogue in 
Abe’s book and, for the purposes of this essay, the most pivotal, name­
ly the case of Heidegger. For Abe, too, Heidegger seems to be the most 
important case because, in Abe’s view, Heidegger even more than 
Whitehead comes closest to the Buddhist way of thinking about 
‘Nothingness’. And yet even Heidegger is brought into question for 
not having quite made it all the way over the bridge into the ontological 
precinct of Buddhist ‘nothingness’: “Heidegger, like Nietzsche, in­
deed, more radically than Nietzsche, focussed upon the problem of 
‘nothingness’ and thereby opened up a standpoint extremely close to 
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Zen” (119). And yet it would seem, says Abe, that even Heidegger did 
not, in the final analysis, depart from 'thinking about Being’ 
(Seinsdenken). His effort was designed “to open up a new path of 
thinking following the traditional course of Western metaphysics ... 
and to make the forgotten ‘Being’ present itself truly as ‘Being’ as 
such” (ibid.). This effort still rests on distinguishing between ‘Being’ 
and ‘beings’, what Heidegger labels the ‘ontological difference’. But 
the Zen Buddhist doctrine of ‘Nothingness’ (seen in Dogen’s “All be­
ings are the Buddha-nature”) can never be truly understood until even 
this Heideggerian idea of the ontological difference is itself “over­
come” (48). Heidegger’s ontology of ‘nothingness’ therefore “does 
not necessarily lead him to the completely dehomocentric, 
cosmological [i.e. Zen] dimension alone in which the impermanence of 
all beings in the universe is fully realized” (67).
Abe concludes his review of this series of Western examples of the 
priority of Being with the final judgment that “the Western mode of 
thinking can never do away with this eternal dilemma”, the dilemma of 
“subject and object, self and world, being and non-being”. Only 
with Zen do we find a point of view in which “all these are swept aside 
as something veiling our insight into the nature of life and reality” (73). 
Clearly, as Abe’s comment indicates, in the context of dialogue, and 
from the Buddhist side, this judgment is not simply a description or 
even an evaluation of conceptual or ontological differences, but a nor­
mative assessment carrying existential and soteriological implications 
as well.
(2) Second, as regards Christian theological doctrine, Abe’s analysis 
applies to the traditional theistic concept of God, which he sees as close­
ly linked to the traditional Western doctrine of the ontological priority 
of Being over Non-being. As we have seen, even contemporary revi­
sionist (e.g. process) doctrines of God, such as Whitehead’s, are not im­
mune from Abe’s radical and thoroughgoing Zen critique. Abe 
acknowledges that, in one sense, “the Christian idea of God is cer­
tainly beyond the duality of subject and object, transcendence and im­
manence, being and non-being” (74). But while it may not be dualistic 
in the ordinary sense, it is when compared to Zen ‘Emptiness’ or 
‘Nothingness’ (75). From the Zen perspective, a dualism remains in 
this Christian doctrine, a “hidden and final dualism” between God 
and Creation, which leaves unanswered the question of “the very 
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origin before duality takes place” (74), what Abe calls elsewhere the 
“ground” from which even God, as different from Creation, must be 
seen to emerge (189). But this question, the overcoming of this duality, 
by reference back to an even more original ground than ‘God’, is one 
which Christian theology fails to address. Hence Christian theology, 
with its personal relation to a personal God of creation, represents, 
from the Buddhist standpoint, a doctrine which “must be thoroughly 
overcome for us to attain a complete liberation” (74; cf. 31).
(3) Third, from a Zen perspective one cannot try to solve this ques­
tion by simply appealing to the divine aseity. Ontologically, Zen’s cri­
tique of the Christian doctrine of God may be expressed in the form 
of the following question: “How is God’s self-existence possible? 
What is the ground of God’s self-existence?” (188-189; cf. 202). 
“From a Buddhist point of view, this idea of a self-sustaining God 
is ultimately inadequate, for Buddhists cannot see the ontological 
ground of this one and self-sustaining God” (189). The idea of “a 
self-sustaining God” which is, as it were, the ground of its own self­
existence, is not only unjustifiable, it is, even worse, simply unintelligi­
ble on Buddhist grounds. It is the very notion of ‘Being’ (including the 
ontological priority of Being as ‘self-existence’, svabhava) that is here 
being radically called into question. It is in fact “overcome” by the 
Buddhist doctrine of the ultimacy of absolute Nothingness, the view, 
already advanced by the Buddha against the traditional Upanishadic 
view of Brahman, that “everything without exception is transitory 
and perishable, nothing being unchangeable and eternal” (189). Thus 
Zen not only can but must raise the question, to both Christian theolo­
gy and Western metaphysics alike: “what is the ground of God’s self­
existence? how can the priority of Being be ontologically justified?” 
Clearly implied, from the Buddhist point of view, is not only the in­
adequacy but the impossibility of any answer from the side of the 
West to these questions.
As noted above, despite this radical critique of Western metaphysics 
and theology, Abe does indicate the need for Zen to learn from 
Western thought. Yet this need does not reach down to the essentials. 
In part but not wholly this follows, as we have seen, from Abe’s view 
of dialogue as a conversation in which each side measures the other by 
means of its own distinctive criteria with a view to determining how 
closely the other can be seen as approximating, or failing to approx­
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imate, the fundamental insights and concepts of one’s own tradition. 
Hence Abe’s acknowledgment of openness to and need for criticism 
from others, especially when the conceptions of those others are 
radically different from one’s own, is carefully formulated in a way 
calculated not to disturb or challenge anything in the fundamentals of 
one’s own tradition. Dialogue leads not only to “mutual under­
standing” but also encourages each tradition to seek “further inner 
development of themselves” (186). But for Abe, while as a result of 
this dialogue Western thought may be “forced to a basic re-examina- 
tion” of its fundamental metaphysical categories and presuppositions, 
Zen is asked only to “internally embrace the standpoints of Western 
‘Being’ and ‘Ought* which have been foreign to itself’ (120). In so 
doing it may “grasp again and renew its own standpoint of ‘Nothing­
ness* ” so as to be able to actualize it “in the present moment of his­
torical time”—but without changing anything in its essentials (ibid.).
What 1 am suggesting, in concluding this section on Abe’s normative 
approach to dialogue, is that while there is nothing exceptionable and 
indeed much that is laudable in the notion that one of the positive out­
comes of dialogue might be the “internal embracing” of ideas previous­
ly viewed as “foreign” and as a consequence the further “inner 
development” of one’s tradition so as to enable it to respond to the 
new situation of global dialogue, it does seem that, while granting Abe 
is approaching this dialogue “from the Buddhist side”, nonetheless the 
burden of the fundamental ontological critique is decidedly one-way. 
Whereas Western thought, whether metaphysical or theological, is be­
ing asked to consider whether its fundamental ontological categories 
(‘Being’, ‘God’) are not only inadequate but ultimately unjustifiable 
(forced to “basic re-examination”), the fundamental ontological cate­
gory of Zen thought (‘Nothingness’) is never seriously challenged, let 
alone called into fundamental question, by anything Western phi­
losophy or theology has to say. Rather it seems simply to be assumed 
that the category of ‘Nothingness’ will be able somehow (dialectical­
ly?) to “internally embrace” these “foreign” categories which are 
nevertheless also said to be “irreducible” to one another. (Abe’s posi­
tion here reads like an interesting reversal of Tillich’s similar-sounding 
claim that ‘Being’ “embraces” both itself and ‘Non-Being’—a claim 
which, not surprisingly, Abe rejects—“from the Buddhist side”.)
We need to ask, therefore, whether there is a possibility of another 
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approach to the conversation between Zen and Western thought, one 
that would call for a radical rethinking of Abe’s Kyoto-school-inspired 
Zen philosophy of ‘Nothingness’ as well, and not just of the Western 
thinking involved in this dialogue. If so, perhaps it will enable us to ask 
in turn, as Abe in a way invites us to do, where, measured by Western 
standards, does Zen thought come close to, or fall short of, the fun­
damental insights of Western thought, and thus prove inadequate, 
perhaps even unjustifiable or unintelligible?
We might also explore the further possibility that perhaps these are 
not even the right questions to be asking in such a dialogue, whatever 
one’s perspective. Is there a different approach to dialogue, one sug­
gested by Heidegger and other contemporary Western thinkers, where 
different sorts of questions and different sorts of assessments would be 
in order instead?
Ill
There is another set of assumptions, not so explicitly stated but 
perhaps for that reason all the more powerfully at work, underlying 
Abe’s second-order approach to and call for dialogue between Zen and 
Western thought. These have to do with one of his announced goals 
for such dialogue: that it provide “a spiritual foundation for future 
humanity in a global age” (xxiii). This general wish is not accidentally 
related to his conviction that, in particular, “a comparative and 
dialogical study of Buddhism and Western thought, Christianity includ­
ed, is absolutely necessary” for providing such a foundation (ibid.). 
What are the ontological assumptions underlying this vision of “the 
new spiritual horizon which future humanity requires,” and why in par­
ticular is it the philosophy of Zen Buddhism and the dialogue between 
Buddhism and Christianity that is especially well-suited for achieving 
this new spiritual foundation? What is required for an ontology to 
have global or universal validity, and why are Buddhism and Christiani­
ty, among all the “world” religions, best suited, in Abe’s judgment, to 
realize such an ontology? These questions may be taken separately, 
but, as just suggested, there may also be an inner connection between 
them.
As an initial point of clarification, what does Abe have in mind when 
he talks of a spiritual “horizon”, “foundation”, or ontology that can 
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provide the basis for a “unified world” or “global age”? In common 
with other members of the so-called “Kyoto School” he has in mind to 
construct, through a “creative synthesis between Western thought and 
the Mahayana tradition” (LaFleur, xii), a new global or “world” 
philosophy, that is, a philosophy capable of bridging and drawing 
together on a common spiritual and ontological foundation “East” 
and “West”. This project is much more ambitious than what one 
usually thinks of as “comparative philosophy, East and West”. Com­
parative philosophy does not necessarily envision or lead to such an 
all-embracing spiritual goal. The kind of “comparative and dialog­
ical” encounter Abe has in mind, on the other hand, does have this 
constructive, global ambition.
In Abe’s case, this global effort seems to proceed on the basis of at 
least three presuppositions: (1) that there is a position-transcending 
position from which we can properly evaluate all other positions; (2) 
that Buddhism and Christianity represent the closest historical approx­
imations to this transcendent (or transcendental) “positionless posi­
tion” in East and West respectively; (3) that Buddhism and Christiani­
ty, insofar as they differ, represent irreducible but not incompatible 
differences, that is, they represent a fundamental polarity in the 
typology of world-historical religions—a polarity between the basic on­
tological categories or “positions” of ‘Being’ and ‘Ought* (Western), 
on the one hand, and ‘Nothingness* (Asian), on the other—so that be­
tween them they cover and exhaust the field of the fundamental 
spiritual and ontological possibilities of philosophy and religion.
(1) The first presupposition already provides the basis for an answer 
to our first question. What makes the goal of a spiritual horizon for a 
unified world possible is the presupposition that there is such a 
position-transcending ontological position as the one indicated above, 
a position which Abe believes to have been historically actualized in 
Zen Buddhism in particular. The Buddhist position, founded on an on­
tology of absolute ‘Nothingness’, “is a ‘positionless position’ in the 
sense that, being itself empty, it lets every other position stand and 
work just as it is” (210). It docs not evaluate those other philosophies 
or religions as “false”, rather it recognizes “the relative truth” they 
contain. It is on the basis of this Buddhist acknowledgment and affirma­
tion of the relative truth of other positions that the possibility of “pro­
ductive dialogue and cooperation” is affirmed (ibid.). The ontological 
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category of ‘Absolute Nothingness’, in short, “may provide a spiritual 
foundation for the formation of the rapidly approaching One World in 
which the co-existence of a variety of contrasting value systems, ways 
of life, and ways of thinking will be indispensable” (ibid.).
It should be noted, however, that there are limits to this second- 
order strategy of affirming the relative truth of other traditions. Should 
a particular tradition resist the relativizing of its first-order truth­
claims, it would be subject to the judgment of being either “false” or, 
worse, “illusory”. “In Buddhism, mutual relativity or inter-dependen­
cy is the ultimate truth, and doctrines of absolute truth which exclude 
other views of truth as false are similarly considered illusory” (209). 
Clearly, there is a second-order ontological criterion here. Only certain 
ways of thinking about the truth of one’s own tradition or of other 
traditions will pass the test.
Given the assumption of a “positionless position” that relativizes 
the absolute truth-claims of all other positions and that does not con­
sider its own doctrine of “Absolute Nothingness” as a “position” in 
its own right (for Abe it is viewed rather as a Zen “deconstruction” of 
all other temptations to absolute claims of truth, including Buddhist 
ones as well—here he refers to the example of Nagarjuna), Abe can 
then without any inconsistency in his own mind claim “on the basis 
of such a metaphysical standpoint, to bring under one purview the 
philosophical thought of the West and East, representing the latter by 
Buddhist thought in particular” (85). (Abe refers to this standpoint 
which transcends the opposition between various first-order metaphysi­
cal positions—e.g., empiricism versus idealism—as “a metaphysical 
standpoint in the best sense of the word”; ibid.). This “positionless 
position”, this metaphysics-transcending meta-metaphysics or doc­
trine of absolute ‘Emptiness’, points to “the ultimate which is beyond 
the opposition between positive and negative [and which] is realized in 
the East in terms of negativity and in the West in terms of positivity” 
(133).
Consistent with his claim that the Zen doctrine of absolute 
Nothingness is not itself a specific first-order doctrine but rather a 
meta-doctrine, a transcendental perspective on all first-order doctrines, 
he concludes that his goal of a unified, global spiritual horizon “does 
not imply a monolithic religion common to East and West, but rather 
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calls for a dynamic structure capable of freely assuming any form, 
oriental or occidental, according to the area in which it develops and 
yet without being confined by any limitation of that area” (270).
The obvious question we must ask, from a Western perspective made 
sensitive to such notions as the “hermeneutical circle” and the 
“theory-laden” nature of all discourse, is whether such a clear distinc­
tion between second-order meta-statements and first-order doctrinal 
statements is in fact possible. If not, is Abe’s second-order, allegedly 
“positionless position” not itself inevitably implicated in and in fact 
derived from a first-order “position” as well—albeit “a metaphysical 
standpoint in the best sense of the word”. If so, what does this do to 
his announced goal of achieving, through dialogue between or among 
different positions, a spiritual horizon common to them all? If we 
remove the ontological presupposition of a second-order “positionless 
position” (a Kyoto-school non-substantialist variation of Fritjhof 
Schuon, S. H. Nasr, and Huston Smith’s “transcendental unity of all 
religions”), if we insist, as followers of Heidegger and Gadamer, that 
all such second-order proposals are themselves hermeneutical reflec­
tions of different first-order positions, then on what other basis can 
Abe’s wished-for productive dialogue proceed? I shall, for the mo­
ment, leave an alternative Heideggerian-inspired answer to Abe’s pro­
posal for the fourth section of this paper.
(2) In the meantime, let us return to our second question above: Why 
does Abe view Buddhist-Christian dialogue in particular as uniquely 
privileged for bringing about the sort of global spiritual horizon he has 
in view? Here we turn to the other two presuppositions mentioned 
above: that Buddhism and Christianity represent the closest world- 
historical approximations to this spiritual vision, and that between 
them they exhaust the fundamental ontological polarities that make up 
the content of such a horizon.
As to the first point, Abe seems to presuppose a quasi-Hegelian or 
spiritual-developmental view of the history of religions, advancing 
from an earlier stage of ‘nature’ or ‘primitive* religions (he gives no ex­
amples, but presumably this would include traditional African or 
Native American religions), to an intermediate stage of ‘ethnic’ or ‘na­
tional’ religions (his examples: Judaism, Hinduism, Taoism, Shin­
toism), and finally reaching the highest stage of the great ‘world’ or 
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‘universal’ religions (examples: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam), which 
represent “the most advanced stage of human consciousness” (265; the 
discussion occurs in ch. 16, esp. pp. 261-265).
It is easy to see, therefore, why Christianity and Buddhism, as 
religions which, according to Abe, are already universal in their inner 
“structures” or soteriological content (in their “inner essences”, as 
compared to nature- or ethnic-based religions, these religions seek the 
universal salvation of all persons based simply on their humanity as in­
dividuals) are also those which, despite their ‘occidental’ or ‘oriental’ 
origins, are best qualified to articulate a new, truly global spiritual 
horizon through dialogue. The outcome of their dialogue is that they 
will thereby become universal in their “outer” or cultural forms as well 
(266, 268). Through dialogue there will arise “an oriental form of 
Christianity” as well as “an occidental form of Buddhism”. These will 
be “the concrete forms taken by the two religions when they become 
truly universal world religions”, that is, “universal forms of world 
religion (268-269). (Abe does not pursue the case of Islam, apparently 
because he is less familiar with it than with Christianity and Buddhism; 
265)
I have already indicated a major difficulty in accepting Abe’s first 
presupposition concerning the nature of a new spiritual horizon for a 
global humanity, namely, the impossibility of establishing, in a non-cir- 
cular manner, a second-order ontological foundation that is theory­
neutral as to all first-order participants in such a global conversation. 
The consequences of that impossibility, when disregarded, are made 
even clearer when we now see its implications for Abe’s reading of the 
possible contribution of specific first-order traditions such as Judaism 
or Hinduism to inter-religious dialogue. They would appear to be dis­
qualified from participating in the co-shaping of that future universal 
spiritual horizon because of their irreducible particularity, not in 
cultural form but, more damagingly, in their very spiritual essence 
(“structure”).
We need to ask, therefore, how a theory of the quasi-historical 
development of the essential structures (and cultural forms) of 
religious consciousness, grounded in a theory of a corresponding 
development in the stages of human consciousness from lowest or most 
“primitive” to highest or most universal, a theory motivated, as we 
have seen, by a specific spiritual and ontological agenda, is to be 
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justified—whether historically, philosophically or, most importantly for 
Abe’s project, religiously or spiritually. Particularly for a late twen­
tieth century Western thinker, especially one speaking out of a Chris­
tian background, the absolute and not merely relative spiritual validity 
of Judaism, in both form and structure, has to be affirmed over against 
any theory, no matter how well-meaning or sincerely-motivated, that 
appears to relegate it (along with other, for example, Native American 
religious traditions) to second or third rank in an otherwise laudable 
effort to shape, through dialogue, a new spiritual horizon for human­
ity’s future.
(3) Finally, Abe has an additional reason, beyond the alleged 
superiority of Buddhism and Christianity as ‘world’ or ‘universal’ 
religions, to give them a privileged position in the effort to shape the 
future spiritual horizon of humanity. According to Abe, Buddhism 
and Christianity between them represent the two polar tendencies that 
together embrace the essential dimensions of spiritual life—the on­
tological, represented by the Zen doctrine of absolute ‘Nothingness’, 
and the axiological, represented by the Christian doctrine of God as a 
personal and moral being, ‘Being’ as ‘Ought*. (One thinks here of 
John Cobb’s argument in his book, Beyond Dialogue, that there are 
not one but two religious “ultimates”, represented by the Buddhist 
view of ultimate reality as ‘Emptiness’ and the Christian view of God 
as a Personal, Moral Reality.) Abe’s distinction is an interesting one, 
and while not, I believe, ultimately defensible, it does shed light on a 
question that has troubled us above. Given that Abe is relatively 
critical of the very foundations of Christianity from a Zen point of 
view, how can he also maintain, without falling into internal incon­
sistency, that nevertheless Zen is in certain respects profoundly in need 
of something from Christianity? The answer lies in his account of the 
polar relation of the two traditions.
On the very last pages of his book, Abe speaks of the importance, in 
the effort to create more universal and globally valid forms of their 
respective religious traditions, for Christianity to incorporate the 
“mystical” or “maternal, receptive” oriental aspect of Buddhism into 
the forms of its religious life and ways of thinking, and for Buddhism, 
likewise, to incorporate “the paternal and justice-oriented” occidental 
aspects of Christianity (274-275). The argument is that each will only 
achieve a fully satisfactory, universal form as a “world” religion when 
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the mystical (oriental) and justice (occidental) poles are harmonized 
and actualized on each side of the dialogue. Clearly, we need to ex­
amine more closely how this polarity is grounded, whether such a har­
monization is indeed possible, and on what or whose terms.
We mentioned earlier Abe’s belief that “it is an oversimplification to 
say that Zen is based on Nothingness, while Christianity is based on 
God as Being, in contrast to non-being” (192). There would be, says 
Abe, no “correspondence” between them if that were so. But on what 
basis is there any “correspondence”, any positive dialogue, between 
Buddhism’s absolute Nothingness and Christianity’s God as Being? 
Abe now provides us with an answer, spelling out his earlier hint of a 
dialectical relationship between these two fundamental and otherwise 
irreducibly different categories.
For Christianity, the concept of God “should not be understood 
merely ontologically, but also axiologically”. Christianity’s chief reli­
gious concern is with the problem of good and evil, and “this is not 
simply an ontological issue, but rather an axiological issue” (192-192). 
For Christians, therefore, the most significant point is not the issue of 
God as ‘Being’ but God as ‘Ought’. In Zen, on the other hand, the cen­
tral religious issue is the problem of being and non-being. The idea of 
justice (the ‘Ought’) is relatively secondary, in fact ‘‘rather lacking, or 
at least very weak” (193).
Abe thus bases his argument on a contrast between “Zen and its on­
tological understanding of Nothingness [and] Christian faith with its 
axiological emphasis on God’s ‘ought’.” Yes, Zen is radically critical 
of Christianity, but on ontological grounds. It finds Christianity’s 
doctrine of God ontologically unjustifiable. But, says Abe, “Zen’s 
criticism of the Christian view of the one God ... does not necessarily 
hit the core of, or do justice to, the essence of Christianity”. The core 
or essence of the Christian concept of God has only secondarily to do 
with the concept of Being, whereas it has everything to do with the con­
cept of the Ought. Therefore, “the strength of Zen is the weakness of 
Christianity and vice versa. Based on this recognition of these mutual 
strengths and weaknesses, we must enter into dialogue” (ibid.).
There are several problems with this resolution of the differences in 
the Buddhist-Christian dialogue. First, as Abe himself notes, in both 
Zen and Christianity “ontological and axiological aspects are in­
separably connected” (ibid.). The fact that one aspect is, allegedly, 
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“more central” to one tradition while the other is “more strongly em­
phasized” by the other does not mean that therefore one aspect 
represents the “strength” of one tradition and the “weakness” of the 
other.
Nor, additionally, does it change the more fundamental fact that, 
since in each tradition these two aspects are inseparably connected— 
that is, bear an internal, logical-conceptual (“structural” or “system­
atic”) connection to one another, one cannot, as it were, lift the axio­
logical (“justice”, “Ought”) aspect out of the Christian context and 
set it down unaltered within the ontological (“mystical”, “Nothing­
ness”) context of Buddhism, where the quite different concepts of 
suffering and karma, not sin and quilt, are the central axiological 
or soteriological ones (ibid.). Nor, going in the other direction, can 
one simply import the Buddhist concept of absolute Nothingness into 
the Christian doctrinal scheme to provide an alternative ontological 
foundation for distinctively Christian axiology or soteriology. For 
Abe has already told us that the fundamental metaphysical categories 
of Nothingness, Being and Ought are irreducibly different. Granted, 
Abe views these polar dimensions of the Buddhist-Christian dialogue 
from a Buddhist perspective on the relative truth of other traditions, 
and from an understanding of dialogue that sees the task of each 
partner to be open to the possibility of assimilating within its own 
tradition such insights of its dialogue partner as can be accommo­
dated to and further the “inner development” of ones’ own tradition 
(186). Nevertheless it is still difficult to see how, conceptually, an axi­
ology grounded in a doctrine of God as Being and Ought can be im­
ported into a different doctrinal structure* or system of thought based 
instead on a doctrine of ultimate reality as Nothingness.
On the last page of his book Abe notes, and rejects, the possibility 
that Christianity and Buddhism are “perhaps too old for such a 
transformation” (275). I would agree with him that the story of 
the possible mutually transformative effects of Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue, far from being over, is, thanks to the efforts of thinkers like 
Masao Abe, just beginning. But the problem is not the “age” of the 
traditions. It is a question of the logical or systematic possibilities of 
transformation, given underlying and irreducibly different fundamen­




My last set of questions addressed to the meta-level of Abe’s project 
concern not his choice of Western thought or a particular Western 
religious tradition (Christianity) as a partner in dialogue, but his use (in 
common with the leading proponents of the Kyoto school) of Western 
philosophy—that is, Western philosophical terminology and the 
Western notion of philosophy itself as involving systematic structures 
of thought—to formulate both the terms and the very structure of that 
dialogue. Here I wish to raise the following question:
(1) First, there are linguistic-conceptual or hermeneutic issues posed 
by the cross-cultural translation or interpretation of philosophical ter­
minology. What are the implications of using Western philosophical 
vocabulary to help clarify the “essence” of Zen “philosophy”? What 
are the implications of, as it were, translating Buddhist terms into 
Western philosophical terms, or of trying at least to fine “cor­
respondences” between Buddhist and Western terms? What, in 
general, are the assumptions, and difficulties, underlying the effort to 
translate philosophical terms across linguistic and cultural borders? 
Why do we assume it is possible at all? What has to be the case for it to 
be so? If such translation is not possible without distortion, or at least 
interpretation, taking place, what does this do to the underlying trans- 
linguistic, trans-cultural ontology implicit in Abe’s effort? What does 
this mean for the project of cross-cultural dialogue in general?
(2) Second, there are critical-systematic or ontological problems rais­
ed by the contemporary Western critique (or “deconstruction”) of 
traditional Western metaphysics and its implications for a similar 
“deconstruction” of Abe’s traditional Western “Zen” reading of 
Western thought. What does this do to the plausibility of the resulting 
use of Zen “philosophy” to critique the very Western philosophical 
tradition from which it derives (at least in part) its own critical ter­
minology? Would it be legitimate, for example, to look at the par­
ticular metaphysics presupposed in Abe’s version of a “Zen” 
philosophy? What if that particular Western metaphysics has itself 
been brought into question by more recent Western thinkers?
(3) Finally, to the extent that Abe’s second-order assumptions concer­
ning the nature, criteria and goal of dialogue are shaped by a Western 
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concept of philosophy as a systematic structure of thought rather than 
by traditional East Asian modes of inter-religious encounter and think­
ing, what does this mean for his ability to remain faithful to the Bud­
dhist, specifically Zen, side of the dialogue?
In brief, Abe’s effort to enter into dialogue with Western thought 
by drawing, in part, on Western philosophy, including a certain charac­
terization of what philosophy itself is, may prove to be a two-edged 
sword that cuts both ways. Abe himself of course recognizes this, 
is quite frank about it, and openly invites this sort of counter-inter- 
rogation in response (186).
(1)1 have already raised the question of the “trans-lation” of con­
cepts from one system of thought to another in the discussion of the 
importing of an axiology of justice from a Christian context into an on­
tology of Nothingness in a Zen context. Of course, this conceptual pro­
blem could occur even when both systems of thought were products of 
the same philosophical or cultural context (say, European metaphysics). 
But what happens when the process of translation has take place be­
tween not just two different metaphysical systems within the same 
cultural and philosophical tradition, but between two different systems 
located in two radically different cultural and philosophical4 * worlds”, 
the worlds of Europe and East Asia? When the “worlds” are not just 
different doctrinal schemes but different cultural and linguistic tradi­
tions as a whole, what does this do to the enterprise of philosophical 
translation? Cross-cultural dialogue is not the same as intra-cultural 
dialogue between thought systems drawing from a common phil­
osophical-cultural heritage. This is not to say that such projects of 
“translation” and “dialogue” are impossible, but can they be pro­
secuted in quite the manner Abe’s project seems to suppose? That is 
our question.
To see at least another, more cautious if not contrary perspective on 
the problematic nature of cross-cultural translation or dialogue in the 
realm of philosophical thought, we need only recall Heidegger’s conver­
sation with a Japanese professor (and translator) of German literature, 
as presented in his essay, “A Dialogue on Language” [all citations 
from Heidegger’s book, On The Way To Language].
Heidegger points to a number of difficulties in a cross-cultural 
dialogue between East Asian and Western thought:
In the discussion of a Japanese term conducted in a European
69
DEAN
language Heidegger observes that:
The languages of the dialogue shifted everything into Euro­
pean. Yet the dialogue tried to say the essential nature of 
Eastasian art and poetry... . The language of the dialogue 
constantly destroyed the possibility of saying what the 
dialogue was about. (4-5)
Why? Because, says Heidegger:
If man by virtue of his language dwells within the claim and 
call of Being, then we Europeans presumably dwell in an en­
tirely different house than Eastasian man. Assuming that the 
languages of the two are not merely different but other in 
nature, and radically so. And so, a dialogue from house to 
house remains nearly impossible. (5)
Despite this difference Japanese thinkers in the Kyoto School have 
tried to construct a truly global philosophy by translating Zen Bud­
dhist terms into a conceptuality that might help Western and Asian 
thinkers alike to better understand the Zen tradition. But, Heidegger 
asks, do you really need Western philosophical “concepts” to ar­
ticulate the spiritual experience of Zen? The Japanese professor 
replies: “Presumably yes, because since the encounter with European 
thinking, there has come to light a certain incapacity in our language.” 
Heidegger says: “Here you are touching on a controversial question. .. 
the question whether it is necessary and rightful for Eastasians to chase 
after the European conceptual systems.” (2-3)
The problem Heidegger is raising proceeds on at least two levels. 
First, are the “languages” in which European and East Asians dwell 
not just different but radically other? Second, are “concepts”, a 
feature distinctive of Western languages, namely, its conceptual sys­
tems, not just unnecessary but seriously inappropriate for expressing 
what and how it is that the Japanese language says?
The language of the dialogue was European; but what was to 
be experienced and to be thought was the Eastasian nature of 
Japanese art. Whatever we spoke about was from the start 
forced over into the sphere of European ideas. (13-14)
Heidegger now goes on to raise an even deeper, more disturbing ques­
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tion: “Could it be that the nature of language remains something 
altogether different for the Eastasian and European peoples”? (23) In 
other words, it is not just that European and East Asian people dwell 
in different language worlds, or that the European languages are 
oriented to concepts whereas East Asian languages may not be, or that 
there may be a discrepancy between European concepts and an East 
Asian experience that is searching for appropriate linguistic ways to be 
said. It is not simply the difficulty of finding the appropriate translation 
for a particular word or experience. It is that the very nature of 
“language” itself may be different in these two worlds. Thus Heidegger 
observes of his own reflections on language that: “This is why I do not 
yet see whether what I am trying to think of as the nature of language is 
also adequate for the nature of Eastasian language; whether in the 
end—which would also be a beginning—a nature of language can reach 
the thinking experience, a nature which would offer the assurance that 
European-Western saying and Eastasian saying will enter into dialogue 
such that in it there sings something that wells up from a single 
source.” (8)
Once again, it is not just that Western and Asian languages are 
different, but that they are other in nature, such that not even a single 
concept, language, can embrace them both. If we can have no 
assurance that, whatever the differences between our respective 
languages, at least what we understand language to be is the same, 
where does this leave the possibility, let alone the prospects, for East- 
West dialogue of the sort Abe proposes?
Heidegger’s answer is a great deal more tentative, perhaps even 
uncertain, than Abe’s:
“Japanese: As you may have surmised, I see more clearly as 
soon as I think in terms of our Japanese experience. But I am 
not certain whether you have your eye on the same. 
Inquirer: That could prove itself in our dialogue.
J: We Japanese do not think it strange if a dialogue leaves 
undefined what is really intended, or even restores it back to 
the keeping of the undefinable.
I: That is part, I believe, of every dialogue that has turned out 
well between thinking beings. As if of its own accord, it can 
take care that that undefinable something not only does not 
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slip away, but displays its gathering force ever more luminous­
ly in the course of the dialogue.” (12-13)
In other words, for Heidegger too dialogue continues, but how and 
why it is possible and where it might lead—these are issues that remain 
to be pondered. Meanwhile there are assumptions to be challenged, 
dangers to be avoided, and outcomes not to be taken for granted— 
perhaps even deliberately left unspecified, unspoken.
With this counter-example from Heidegger in mind, let us return to 
some of Abe’s observations about the terminological differences and 
difficulties in translating the Zen spiritual experience into a Western 
philosophical vocabulary—and on that basis, question once again the 
success or even propriety of any Zen critique of Western thought on 
the basis of a translation thus conceived.
Abe himself is sensitive to this difficulty of finding concepts in 
Western philosophical vocabulary that even correspond to, let alone 
adequately translate, the meaning of key Buddhist doctrinal terms. The 
most fundamental problem of translation, of course, concerns the 
Japanese terms for ‘Nothingness’ and ‘Being’, mu and u respectively. 
Abe explains this partly in terms of the fundamental conceptual bias of 
the Western metaphysical tradition in favor of “the priority of Being 
over non-being”, but partly in terms of the underlying, and related, 
disposition of the Western tradition not to take the fundamental 
human experience of “negativity” as deeply or seriously as it is in the 
Buddhist tradition. But he provides other examples as well of fun­
damental terms and/or doctrines which have no exact equivalent in, or 
are even completely foreign to, Western ideas and/or experience, and 
hence which cannot be adequately translated due to this lack of cor­
respondence, this absence of common ground in thought or ex­
perience.
There are, for example, ji and ri, translated (that is, interpreted) by 
Abe as ‘the particular’ (“actual, phenomenal, particular, temporal, 
and differentiated”) and ‘the universal* (“ideal, noumenal, universal, 
eternal, and undifferentiated”) respectively (84). Though the philo­
sophical positions (empiricism, idealism) which try to understand this 
“opposition and tension” are, Abe says, “common to both East and 
West”, nevertheless Buddhist and Western thought “differ greatly in 
their concrete understanding" of the phenomena referred to by these 
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terms (ibid.). Thus the content of what is referred to by the Japanese 
term, ri, is “radically different” from what the tern “universal” means 
in Western thought. For one thing, it is “mutually nondual with ji as 
the particular'* (ibid.). But if this is so, one has to ask Abe how it is 
that the associated philosophical positions (in the West labelled “em­
piricism’* and “idealism”) can in any way whatsoever be regarded as 
“common” to East and West.
As mentioned above, the most fundamental problem of translation 
concerns the Japanese terms for ‘Nothingness’ and ‘Being*, mu and u 
respectively. They are, along with ji and n, “the key terms employed 
throughout the discussion** (281, n.2). In particular, the concept of 
‘Nothingness* is the fundamental term in Abe’s account of the struc­
tural difference between Buddhist and Western ways of thinking. What 
makes of Zen Buddhist philosophy, in John Hick’s words, “a radical 
alternative” to Western metaphysical assumptions as a whole (ix), is 
that “the ultimate in Zen (and in Buddhism) is neither ‘Being’ nor 
‘Ought’, but rather ‘absolute Nothingness’ or ‘Emptiness’, which is 
dynamically identical with ‘wondrous Being’ or ‘Fullness’ ” (Abe, xxi- 
xxii).
It is of crucial importance, therefore, for a dialogue between Zen 
Buddhism and Western thought, to be able to translate the Japanese 
term for ‘absolute Nothingness*, mu, into a Western philosophical 
vocabulary that, however different from traditional Western categories 
of thinking, is nonetheless somehow intelligible in terms that Western 
thought can understand. To the extent that no equivalent Western ter­
minology can be found, to that extent must the effort at translation 
founder and the enterprise of dialogue, as Abe understands it, itself be 
rendered problematic. But a dilemma then arises: to the extent that the 
translation of Zen Buddhism’s mu into the alien language of Western 
philosophical vocabulary succeeds, the question arises: to what extent 
has a reinterpretation, if not distortion, of mu occurred that now 
renders it, in turn, foreign to what, in the context of its original setting 
in Japanese religious experience, mu really says? Could it be that, as 
Heidegger points out, “the language of the dialogue constantly 
destroyed the possibility of saying what the dialogue was about”, name­
ly, the Japanese Zen experience of mul
That this remains a serious problem for Abe’s enterprise is attested 
to by several comments Abe himself makes on just these critical terms, 
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mu and u. The idea of mu. common to Taoism as well as Buddhism, 
that is, the idea of nothingness as ultimate, has “no Western counter­
part” (124). The reason is that “/nu, which stands for English term 
‘non-being*, has an important connotation which is different from 
‘non-being’ ” (281, n.3). Specifically, “the English equivalents of ab­
solute Mu. non-being or nothingness, do not sufficiently carry the 
original meaning whose logical structure is: absolute negation (the nega­
tion of negation) is absolute affirmation” (287, n.7). Abe himself con­
cludes, therefore, that “lam painfully aware that the English transla­
tion ‘Nothingness’ is rather misleading in a Western context” (198). In 
fact, it is a term whose meaning, in its “absolute” sense, transcends the 
very distinction between ‘being’ and ‘non-being* itself (198). As a 
result, it ends up, as we have seen, having a significance that is ‘non­
dual* with ‘wondrous* Being* or ‘Fullness’ (terms which, in a “rela­
tive” sense at least, are its apparent “opposites”).
It follows that u too, does not mean in Japanese what ‘being’ (or 
‘Being’) means in English. For one thing, most nouns in Japan and 
China, unlike in most European languages, Abe points out, “generally 
make no distinction between singular and plural. Hence the term u can 
mean beings, being or Being itself ” (281-282, n.3). And Abe confesses 
that in these essays he himself “in most cases, uses the term without 
differentiating between beings, being and Being itself’ (ibid.). In the 
light of the recent ordeal Heidegger has put us through insisting on the 
“ontological difference” of “beings” and “Being”, this is an 
astonishing admission and warns us to be on our guard about subse­
quent critical comments directed against Heidegger from the stand­
point of an undifferentiated use of mu. (This is not to say that such 
criticisms may not be merited, but just that we must be exceedingly 
careful in acceding to such judgments.) Of the term ‘wondrous Being’ 
itself, U. viewed as nondually identical in meaning with ‘absolute 
Nothingness’, Mu. Abe appropriately concludes that “the Buddhist 
idea of wondrous Being is clearly different from the idea of ‘Being’ 
understood as ultimate Reality in the West”, the latter being viewed, in 
Abe’s terms, as “ontologically prior to non-being,” rather than non­
dually identical with it (130).
Abe seems to suggest, in a manner echoing Heidegger’s observation, 
that perhaps underlying these radical conceptual differences of East 
and West is a radically different experience of life in Buddhism than the 
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one reflected in the Western tradition: “the negativity of human life is 
felt more seriously and deeply in Buddhism than among the followers 
of Western intellectual traditions” (ibid.). It is viewed as equal in 
significance, not inferior to, the “positivity” of existence reflected, on 
the doctrinal level, in the Western assignment of “ontological priori­
ty” to Being over Nothingness (ibid.).
This brings us face to face with the suggestion contained in Heideg­
ger’s remarks on the problematic nature of dialogue between Western- 
European and East-Asian ways of thinking and speaking. For as Abe 
at one point observes, we have to consider the possibility that in the 
final analysis the basic terms of Zen Buddhism, especially mu and u, 
may, superficial resemblances to the contrary notwithstanding, be 
terms “which probably cannot be adequately translated into any Euro­
pean language because there is nothing in the Western way of thinking 
[or experience?] corresponding to them” (284, n.21)
One possible conclusion from these observations, which seems to 
make the idea of a philosophical dialogue between Zen and Western 
thought “nearly impossible” (Heidegger), is that the enterprise of clari­
fying the essence of Mahayana, and especially Zen Buddhism with the 
help of dialogue with Western philosophy “in order to avoid entangle­
ment in the doctrinal complexity and stereotyped practice of the tradi­
tional forms of Buddhism” (xxiii), Abe’s other major goal in these 
essays, perhaps simply cannot be realized, at least not in a European 
language, and that such an effort will not only run the risk of distorting 
Zen thought and the Zen tradition itself, but will also mislead Western 
efforts to understand the Zen experience as well.
(2) Our second question concerned the extent to which Abe’s transla­
tion project is shaped by reliance upon a particular tradition of 
Western philosophy and thus open to whatever deconstructive critique 
that tradition itself has more recently undergone. I shall comment on 
this issue only briefly here, reserving fuller discussion for the second 
part of this article. For the present it must suffice simply to raise the 
question whether, if Abe’s project of dialogue with the West succeeds, 
it is because, already on the side of his Zen “philosophy”, the dialogue 
has been determined by the particular history and nature of “philoso­
phy” in Japan which, prior to the advent of the Kyoto School and still 
today, has meant Western philosophy. In the work of the Kyoto 
School it has been German philosophy, above all nineteenth century 
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German Idealism, which has shaped the image of “Western philos­
ophy” in terms of which a “Zen philosophy” is then formulated, 
It appears to be this tradition of classical German metaphysics 
upon which Abe draws for the logical or dialectical tools, the onto­
logical vocabulary, and the topics of discussion for his “Zen” cri­
tique of Western thought, and which, curiously, shapes even the 
perspective from which he judges such later critics of the tradition as 
Nietzsche and Heidegger.
What I am suggesting, as I shall try to document in the second part 
of this article, is that beneath the surface of the official dialogue be­
tween Abe’s “Zen philosophy” and “Western thought” there is 
another, more fundamental philosophical dialogue that has already 
taken place—a decision made, a verdict rendered—in which the radical 
implications of Nietzsche’s and especially Heidegger’s critique of 
the German metaphysical tradition and behind that of the “onto- 
theo-logical” (Heidegger’s term) tradition of Western philosophy as a 
whole are, as it were, set aside or not fully considered. But if Abe’s cri­
tique of Western thought, as well as the formulation of his own Zen 
philosophy, is shaped by an onto-theo-logical tradition of Western 
philosophy which has itself been radically challenged by such thinkers 
as Nietzsche, Heidegger, or Derrida, must this not raise the question of 
a further extension of the dialogue between Zen philosophy and 
Western thought, one that incorporates not only Western efforts to 
“deconstruct” the Western tradition but also, by implication, a 
deconstructing of Abe’s Zen critique of that tradition to the extent that 
it relies on that very tradition for its tools, terminology, and issues?
(3) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given that the very no­
tion, the very meaning, of ‘philosophy” in the Japanese setting is 
primarily Western-style philosophy, an attempt to formulate a “phi­
losophy” of Zen, even prior to dialogue with any particular Western 
school or thinker, must be highly problematic at the outset, for several 
reasons:
(i) As Heidegger observes, it inevitably leads to trying to say the fun­
damental Japanese (Zen) experience in a language alien to it;
(ii) it draws on a particular kind of language to do so, namely, the 
language of concepts, which may be alien to Zen experience in par­
ticular;
(iii) by seeing Zen as having a “philosophy” in the Western sense, 
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namely, a structured thought-system, it is forced to construe dialogue 
as a critical conversation, perhaps even a polemic struggle, between 
competing (“alternative”) systems of thought. But this seems, as 
earlier indicated, to be a characteristically Western model of dialogue, 
a model alien to the East-Asian experience of inter-religious encounter 
(e.g., the inter-weaving of Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism and Shin­
toism in Japan). If so, then at this level the “dialogue” is, as it were, 
over before it starts—and it is not clear that it is the Zen side that 
comes out the “winner”.
In saying this I do not want to be mistaken. Abe’s effort to show that 
Zen, too, has a “philosophical basis” beneath the surface of its “non- 
philosophical” experience or praxis is important in any case, and even 
more so in this era of global dialogue. But the question that must be 
kept in mind is: in trying to formulate the “essence” of Zen philos­
ophy in a Western language, particularly in Western metaphysical 
concepts and in the Western form of a structured system of thought, 
at what cost to Zen experience and the Zen tradition can this dialogue 
be pursued, and with what likelihood of arriving at its stated goal?
In summary, I have tried in this first part of my article to examine 
several second-order issues in Abe’s formulation of a dialogue between 
Zen philosophy and Western thought. In particular I have raised ques­
tions about Abe’s general understanding of: (I) the basis and possibili­
ty of such dialogue; (II) the nature and criteria of dialogue; (III) the 
particular ontology that informs his approach to dialogue, and why 
this privileges Buddhist-Christian dialogue in particular; and finally, 
(IV) the critical implications of his attempt to articulate this project in 
the terminology and structures of Western philosophical thought.
In the second part of this article I shall examine (V) what, from a 
Heideggerian perspective, would seem to be the traditional Western 
metaphysical character of Abe’s Zen critique of Western thought; (VI) 
how, if so, this leaves Abe’s critique open to counter-criticism from re­
cent developments in Western philosophy, especially those drawing on 
Heidegger; and (VII) some suggestions as to an alternative approach to 
some of the issues arising out of a dialogue between Zen and Western 
thought.
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